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Abstract. In a multi-secret sharing scheme (MSSS), ` different secrets are distributed among the players in some
set P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, each one according to an access structure. The trivial solution to this problem is to run `
independent instances of a standard secret sharing scheme, one for each secret. In this solution, the length of the
secret share to be stored by each player grows linearly with ` (when keeping all other parameters fixed).
Multi-secret sharing schemes have been studied by the cryptographic community mostly from a theoretical per-
spective: different models and definitions have been proposed, for both unconditional (information-theoretic) and
computational security. In the case of unconditional security, there are two different definitions. It has been proved
that, for some particular cases of access structures that include the threshold case, a MSSS with the strongest level
of unconditional security must have shares with length linear in `. Therefore, the optimal solution in this case is
equivalent to the trivial one.
In this work we prove that, even for a more relaxed notion of unconditional security, and for some kinds of access
structures (in particular, threshold ones), we have the same efficiency problem: the length of each secret share must
grow linearly with `. Since we want more efficient solutions, we move to the scenario of MSSSs with computational
security. We propose a new MSSS, where each secret share has constant length (just one element), and we formally
prove its computational security in the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formal
analysis on the computational security of a multi-secret sharing scheme.
We show the utility of the new MSSS by using it as a key ingredient in the design of two schemes for two
new functionalities: multi-policy signatures and multi-policy decryption. We prove the security of these two new
multi-policy cryptosystems in a formal security model. The two new primitives provide similar functionalities as
attribute-based cryptosystems, with some advantages and some drawbacks that we discuss at the end of this work.
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1 Introduction
In public key cryptography, some operations (like encrypting a message or verifying a signature) can be done
by any user in the system, with access to the public information of the other users. However, the associated
secret operations (decrypting a ciphertext or signing a message) can be done only by the user who knows the
corresponding secret information. Security of public key cryptosystems (against polynomial-time adversaries)
is proved in a computational sense, by reduction to the hardness of some mathematical problem.
In some situations, such secret tasks are too important and sensitive to rely on a single user or machine;
a good solution then is to use distributed (in particular, threshold) public key cryptography: the secret
information is distributed among a set of users, and the cooperation of some authorized subset (in a fixed
access structure) of them is required in order to correctly perform the corresponding secret task. Depending
on the considered secret task, this approach leads to either distributed decryption schemes or distributed
signature schemes.
In the design of such distributed schemes, a key ingredient are secret sharing schemes. These schemes
have received a lot of attention since their introduction in 1979 [28, 3, 13, 8, 27]. Most of the secret sharing
schemes proposed and analyzed so far enjoy unconditional (or information-theoretic) security, which means
that the value of the shared secret is perfectly hidden to an (even computationally unbounded) adversary
who controls any non-authorized subset of users. When secret sharing schemes are used in the design of
distributed public key cryptosystems (that can enjoy computational security, at most), one could argue that
requiring unconditional security for the underlying secret sharing schemes may be innecessarily restrictive.
However, secret sharing schemes may have future applications in other scenarios with unconditional security,
or in scenarios requiring security during concurrent executions of a protocol, and they are very interesting
and mathematically rich by themselves. It is thus a good idea to obtain results about secret sharing schemes
with unconditional security, for instance about lower and upper bounds on the ratio between the length of
the secret and the length of the share to be stored by each user.
In this work we consider an extension of the standard scenario of distributed (public key) cryptography.
In some cases, setting a single access structure of authorized subsets of users for all the executions of the
secret task may be unrealistic. For instance, some messages encrypted for a receiver entity P may be more
sensitive or confidential than others, and so require the cooperation of more or less members of P in order to
be decrypted. With this motivation in mind, we will consider multi-policy distributed cryptosystems: in the
setup of the system, a list of ` possible (and different) acces structures is chosen; later, for each execution
of the cryptographic operation, a specific access structure in this list is chosen “on the fly”, depending
on the desired security level. Only those subsets of players authorized with respect to this specific access
structure will be able to perform the secret task, by using their secret shares of information. A trivial way
of implementing multi-policy distributed cryptosystems is by running ` independent instances of a standard
distributed cryptosystem, one for each of the access structures in the list. This solution has the drawback
that the length of the secret information to be stored by each user is linear in `, when keeping all other
parameters fixed; we look for more efficient solutions.
As it happens with standard distributed cryptosystems, where standard secret sharing schemes are a key
ingredient in their design, it is natural that multi-secret sharing schemes (MSSSs, for short) are a key tool
when designing multi-policy distributed cryptosystems. In a MSSS, ` different secrets are distributed among
the players in some set P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, each one according to a (possibly different) access structure. Again,
a trivial solution to design a MSSS is to run ` independent standard secret sharing schemes, one for each
secret and access structure; the length of each secret share is linear in `.
Multi-secret sharing schemes have been studied, per se, in different works (see [4, 25, 23], for instance).
As far as we know, no specific application of a MSSS into a more general scenario or cryptographic protocol
has been explicitly proposed. Most of the works on MSSSs have focused on unconditionally secure MSSSs.
Blundo et al. [4] introduced a strong definition for the unconditional security of a MSSS, and gave some lower
bounds on the length of the secret shares to be stored in a MSSS enjoying that level of security. Masucci
proposed in [25] a weaker (althoug still information-theoretic) notion of security for MSSSs, and also gave
some lower bounds on the length of secret shares for schemes enjoying the two notions. For some particular
cases, which include the threshold case where each access structure is defined by a threshold value, the results
in [4, 25] imply that the length of each secret share in a MSSS with the strong level of unconditional security
must be, at least, linear in `.
The first result in this paper, in Section 2, is a proof that this is also the case for MSSSs enjoying security
in the weaker (but still information-theoretic) sense proposed by Masucci. That is, we show that for some
lists of access structures (in particular, when all of them are threshold ones), the length of each secret share in
a MSSS for these access structures will be linear in `, even if the MSSS enjoys weaker unconditional security.
Since our final goal is the design of multi-policy distributed schemes (in particular, for threshold policies)
with shorter secret shares of information than those provided by the trivial solution (with length linear in `),
our first result is quite negative, and forces us to move to the weaker setting of MSSSs with computational
security.
We stress here that computationally secure MSSSs will be enough for our purposes, because the security
of multi-policy distributed cryptosystems can be at most computational, anyway. After describing formally
the computational security of a MSSS, we present in Section 3 the second contribution of this paper: a new
MSSS, inspired by that in [23], with a formal proof of computational security, in the random oracle model.
Although we describe and analyze the scheme for the case of threshold access structures, it can be easily
extended to more general access structures (see Appendix B).
Finally, we use this new MSSS as a key tool to design a new multi-policy distributed signature scheme
(in Section 4) and a new multi-policy distributed decryption scheme (in Section 5). We prove the security
of these two schemes, in the random oracle model, by taking into account formal security models that we
introduce in the corresponding sections. Only the details for the signature scheme are included. Again, and
for simplicity, we describe the schemes for the threshold case, but extensions to the case of more general
policies are easy to do, as we discuss in Appendix B. The efficiency of the new multi-policy distributed
cryptosystems is essentially the same as the efficiency of the standard distributed cryptosystems (Boldyreva
[5] for signatures and Shoup-Gennaro [31] for decryption) by which they are inspired. Namely, the length of
secret shares, ciphertexts and signatures, and the cost of encryption, decryption, signature and verification
are the same; the only change is in the size of the public parameters and public key of the set P, which is
increased by a factor of n · `.
In Section 6 we discuss the relations between the new primitives of multi-policy distributed cryptosys-
tems and attribute-based cryptosystems. Even if any attribute-based cryptosystem leads to a multi-policy
distributed cryptosystem, the obtained scheme has some drawbacks that are not present in the solutions that
we propose in Sections 4 and 5. For instance, our new MSSS and our multi-policy distributed schemes can be
modified (see Appendix A) so that no external and trusted entity is needed in the life of the system; this is
not possible in attribute-based solutions, where a trusted master entity generates and distributes the secret
information to the members of the set P.
2 Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section we recall the notions of information entropy, standard secret sharing schemes and multi-secret
sharing schemes. Then we discuss the security properties required for multi-secret sharing schemes, in both
an information-theoretic and a computational scenario. As our first (negative) result, we will prove that
multi-secret sharing schemes enjoying information-theoretic security, for some families of access structures
that include the threshold case, must have shares which are as long as the secret.
2.1 Entropy of Random Variables
Let X be a random variable that takes values in a finite set X. For any x ∈ X, let p(x) = Pr[X = x] be the
probability that X takes the value x. The entropy H(X) of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) · log(p(x)),
where 0 · log 0 should be treated as being equal to zero. The entropy H(X) measures the uncertainty on the
value taken by the random variable X. It always satisfies 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log |X|. The minimum value H(X) = 0
is achieved if and only if there exists x0 ∈ X such that p(x0) = 1, and the maximum value H(X) = log |X| is
achieved if and only if the probability is distributed uniformly (that is, p(x) = 1/|X| for all x ∈ X).
Given two random variables X,Y , their joint entropy is defined as
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
p(x, y) · log(p(x, y)),
where p(x, y) = Pr[X = x and Y = y].
If we denote p(x|y) = Pr[X = x | Y = y], then the conditional entropy H(X|Y ) is defined as
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(y)p(x|y) · log(p(x|y)),
and it satisfies H(X|Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ).
Similarly, we can define H(X| Y,Z) or H(X,Y |Z), for random variables X,Y, Z. In the proof of our
Theorem 1 in Section 2.3, we will use the following well-known results about the entropy of random variables.
They are more or less easy to deduce from the previous definitions, so we only include one of the proofs,
as an illustrative example. The interested reader can consult [11] for more results on the entropy of random
variables.
Lemma 1. For all random variables X,Y , it holds H(X) +H(Y ) ≥ H(X,Y ) ≥ H(X).
Lemma 2. For all random variables X,Y, Z, if H(X|Y ) = 0, then H(Z|X) ≥ H(Z|Y ).
Proof. First of all, it is easy to see that H(Z|X) ≥ H(Z| X,Y ) and H(Z,X |Y ) ≥ H(Z|Y ), for any random
variables X,Y, Z. Now we have
H(Z|X) ≥ H(Z| X,Y ) = H(Z,X, Y )−H(X,Y ) = H(Z,X, Y )− (H(Y ) +H(X|Y )) (∗)=
= H(Z,X, Y )−H(Y ) = H(Z,X |Y ) ≥ H(Z|Y ),
where we have used in (∗) the fact that H(X|Y ) = 0. uunionsq
Lemma 3. For all random variables X,Y , if H(X|Y ) = H(X), then H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y ).
Lemma 4. For all random variables X,Y , if H(X|Y ) = 0, then H(X,Y ) = H(Y ).
2.2 Standard Secret Sharing Schemes
The idea of secret sharing schemes was independently introduced by Shamir [28] and Blakley [3]. Let P =
{P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n players. In this set of players, a family of authorized or qualified subsets Γ ⊂ 2P
is defined. This family is called the access structure of the scheme, and it must be monotone increasing; that
is, if A1 ∈ Γ and A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ P, then A2 ∈ Γ .
Given a monotone increasing access structure Γ and a secret to be shared, the idea behind a secret sharing
scheme is that each player Pi ∈ P receives during the distribution phase a share shi of a secret s ∈ K, where K
is the space of possible secrets. Later, during the reconstruction phase, the secret can be univocally recovered
from the shares of any authorized subset, A ∈ Γ . On the other hand, from the shares of a non-authorized
subset, out of Γ , no information about the secret should be obtained. These two requirements (correctness
and unconditional security) can be formalized by using information-theoretic tools such as the entropy of
a random variable. Namely, if we use notation S for the random variable associated to the secret, SHi for
the random variable associated to the share of player Pi, and more generally SHA for the (vector) random
variable associated to the shares of players in A ⊂ P, the two required properties for a perfect secret sharing
scheme become: (1) H(S|SHA) = 0 for any subset A ∈ Γ , and (2) H(S|SHB) = H(S) for any subset B /∈ Γ .
Shamir proposed in [28] a threshold scheme, where subsets that can recover the secret are those with at
least t members (t is the threshold); in other words, the access structure is Γ = {A ⊂ P : |A| ≥ t}. The set
K of possible secrets is a finite field. To share a secret s ∈ K, a random polynomial f(x) ∈ K[x] with degree
at most t− 1 is chosen, such that f(0) = s. The share received by every player Pi ∈ P is shi = f(αi), where
αi are non-zero, pairwise different and publicly known elements of K. Any subset of t or more shares allow
recovery of the secret by polynomial interpolation, whereas any set of less than t shares give no information
at all about the secret s. We will denote as T (t, n) such a threshold access structure.
2.3 Syntax and Security of Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes
Blundo et al. introduced in [4] the notion of multi-secret sharing schemes: ` secrets s1, . . . , s` ∈ K are
distributed at the same time between a set P of n players, according to ` access structures Γ1, . . . , Γ` ⊂ 2P .
Again, shi denotes the share of secret information received by each player Pi in the distribution phase. The
reconstruction phase takes as input a subset of shares and an index j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}, and the expected output
is the secret sj . In [4], two requirements are defined for multi-secret sharing schemes, one related to correctness
and one related to information-theoretic privacy.
1. Correctness. If the reconstruction phase takes a subset of shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈A and an index j as inputs,
and A ∈ Γj , then the recovered secret is actually sj . In other words, H(Sj |SHA) = 0 for any subset A ∈ Γj .
2. Strong information-theoretic security. From the knowledge of a non-authorized subset of shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈B,
with B /∈ Γj , and of some secrets, different from sj , the information obtained on the secret sj is the same
as if the shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈B were not known. In the entropy language: for any subset B /∈ Γj and any
subset T ⊂ {S1, . . . , S`}\{Sj}, it holds H(Sj |SHB, T ) = H(Sj |T ).
This strong security requirement has an impact on the efficiency of multi-secret sharing schemes. Blundo et
al. give in [4] lower bounds for the size of the shares shi in such a strongly secure multi-secret sharing scheme.
In particular, for the case where all the access structures are threshold, that is Γj = {A ⊂ P : |A| ≥ tj}
and 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n, Blundo et al. proved that the entropy H(SHi) of each individual share shi
must be greater than or equal to the entropy H(S) of the global secret S = (S1, . . . , S`), in any multi-secret
sharing scheme satisfying this strong security condition. This means that running ` independent instances
of Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme gives an optimal multi-secret sharing scheme for the threshold
case, if strong information-theoretic security is required.
Other works [20, 25] consider a weaker (but maybe more realistic in actual applications of secret sharing)
security notion for multi-secret sharing schemes, which does not consider the possibility that the adversary
obtains some other subset T of secrets.
– Weak information-theoretic security. No information at all on the secret sj can be obtained from a non-
authorized subset of shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈B, with B /∈ Γj . In the entropy language: for any subset B /∈ Γj ,
it holds H(Sj |SHB) = H(Sj).
Masucci gives in [25] lower bounds for the size of the shares shi in such weakly information-theoretically
secure multi-secret sharing schemes. However, these bounds do not lead to any result for the case of multi-
secret sharing with threshold access structures. Therefore, according to the results that we have up to now,
it may still be possible to design a multi-secret sharing scheme for the threshold case which enjoys weak
information-theoretic security, and where the share of some participant is shorter than the secret. However,
we prove below that this cannot be the case.
Theorem 1. Let Γ1, . . . , Γ` ⊂ 2P be ` access structures, and let Pi ∈ P. Assume there exist subsets of players
B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ B` ⊂ P − {Pi} satisfying, for all j = 1, . . . , `, the following three conditions:
(i) Bj ∈ Γj−1, whenever j > 1.
(ii) Bj /∈ Γj,
(iii) Bj ∪ {Pi} ∈ Γj,
Then, for any multi-secret sharing scheme for Γ1, . . . , Γ` with weak unconditional security, it holds H(SHi) ≥∑`
j=1
H(Sj).
Proof. First of all, by combining conditions (ii) and (iii) in the Theorem, and Lemmas 3 and 4, we have
that, for all j = 1, . . . , `, it holds
H(SHi, SHBj )−H(SHBj ) = H(SHi,SHBj , Sj) +H(Sj)−H(SHBj , Sj) (1)
Now, for all j = 1, . . . , `− 1, we have
H(SHi, SHBj , Sj) = H(SHBj , Sj) +H(SHi | SHBj , Sj) ≥
H(SHBj , Sj) +H(SHi | SHBj+1 , Sj) =
H(SHBj , Sj) +H(SHi,SHBj+1 , Sj)−H(SHBj+1 , Sj) =
H(SHBj , Sj) +H(SHi,SHBj+1 , Sj)−H(SHBj+1) ≥
H(SHBj , Sj) +H(SHi, SHBj+1)−H(SHBj+1).
The first inequality is deduced by applying Lemma 2 to SHBj and SHBj+1 , because Bj ⊂ Bj+1. The
last inequality is deduced by applying Lemma 1. Furthermore, we have applied Lemma 4 to deduce that
H(SHBj+1 , Sj) = H(SHBj+1), because Bj+1 ∈ Γj .
Plugging the inequality into equation (1), we obtain
H(SHi,SHBj )−H(SHBj ) ≥ H(Sj) +H(SHi, SHBj+1)−H(SHBj+1) (2)
for all j = 1, . . . , `− 1.
For j = `, we have H(SHi, SHB`) = H(SHi,SHB` , S`), because B` ∪ {Pi} ∈ Γ`. This equality can
be rewritten as H(SHB`) + H(SHi | SHB`) = H(SHB`) + H(SHi, S` | SHB`). But now we can use that
H(SHi, S` | SHB`) ≥ H(S` | SHB`) = H(S`), because B` /∈ Γ`. Putting all together, we conclude that
H(SHi,SHB`) ≥ H(SHB`) +H(S`), which we rewrite as
H(SHi, SHB`)−H(SHB`) ≥ H(S`). (3)
Now we can use H(SHi) +H(SHB1) ≥ H(SHi,SHB1), by Lemma 1, to start a chain of inequalities, where
we apply inequality (2) for j = 1, . . . , `− 1, and finally inequality (3), to obain the desired result:
H(SHi) ≥ H(SHi, SHB1)−H(SHB1)
(2)
≥ H(S1) +H(SHi,SHB2)−H(SHB2)
(2)
≥
. . .
(2)
≥
`−1∑
j=1
H(Sj) +H(SHi,SHB`)−H(SHB`)
(3)
≥
∑`
j=1
H(Sj).
uunionsq
Corollary 1. For any multi-secret sharing scheme, for access structures defined by thresholds 1 ≤ t1 < t2 <
. . . < t` ≤ n, that enjoys weak information-theoretic security, it holds H(SHi) ≥
∑`
j=1
H(Sj), for any player
Pi ∈ P.
Proof. Just apply the previous theorem to a sequence of subsets B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ . . . B` ⊂ P − {Pi} such that
|Bj | = tj − 1, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , `. uunionsq
This means that the optimal multi-secret sharing scheme for the threshold case with weak unconditional
security, in terms of the ratio between the length of shares and the length of the global secret, is equivalent
to running ` independent instances of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
We stress that the three conditions in the statement of Theorem 1 imply that all the access structures
must be different. If there was some repeated access structure, but the non-repeated ones did still satisfy
these three conditions, then some variations of the theorem could be easily proved. For instance, if Γ1 = Γ2
but the rest of access structures satisfy the conditions, then we can ensure that H(SHi) ≥
∑`
j=2
H(Sj) for all
player Pi ∈ P.
As an explicit example where Theorem 1 cannot be applied, and where H(SHi) <
∑`
j=1
H(Sj), let us
consider the case of ` threshold access structures with the same threshold: Γj = T (t, n) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
We can share the global secret s = (s1, . . . , s`) ∈ (Zp)` by following the ideas proposed in [12], provided
` ≤ t(n − t). For some big prime number p, there are ` values xj,0 ∈ Zp, for j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, assigned to the
secrets, and there are n − t values xi,k assigned to player Pi, for k ∈ {1, . . . , n − t}. All these values must
be pairwise different and public. To distribute the secret s, a random polynomial f(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree
at most t(n − t) − 1 is chosen, such that f(xj,0) = sj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Player Pi receives the share
shi = (f(xi,1), . . . , f(xi,n−t)) ∈ (Zp)n−t. If t players work together, they can interpolate the polynomial f(x)
at any point and recover any of the secrets, because they hold t(n− t) evaluations of the polynomial, which
has degree at most t(n− t)− 1. If less than t players cooperate, they obtain no information on any secret sj ,
for j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, and so the scheme enjoys weak unconditional security. If n− t < `, the length of each shi
is strictly smaller than the length of the global secret s.
Anyway, for the applications of multi-secret sharing that we have in mind, we are looking for efficient
ways of sharing ` secrets for ` different access structures, in particular for the threshold case. The result in
Theorem 1, although very interesting from a theoretical point of view, is quite negative for our interests,
and we thus move to the scenario of computationally secure multi-secret sharing. This is not a big problem,
taking into account that our final goal is to use multi-secret sharing schemes as an ingredient to implement
cryptographic primitives (multi-policy distributed decryption and signatures) whose security is going to be
at most computational, in any case.
2.4 Computational Security for Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes
In the setting of computational security, a multi-secret sharing scheme Ω = (Ω.Stp, Ω.Dist, Ω.Rec) consists
of three protocols. The setup protocol takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N, the set of players P and
the ` access structures Γ1, . . . , Γ`, and outputs some public and common parameters pms for the scheme
(such as the access structures and set of players, mathematical groups, hash functions, etc.). We implicitly
assume that pms also contains the descriptions of P and the access structures. We denote an execution of
this protocol as pms← Ω.Stp (1λ,P, {(j, Γj)}1≤j≤`).
The distribution protocol takes as input pms and the global secret s = (s1, . . . , s`) to be distributed, and
produces the set of shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈P and possibly some public output outpub. We write (outpub, {(i, shi)}Pi∈P)←
Ω.Dist (pms, s).
The reconstruction protocol takes as input pms, outpub, an index j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, and the shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈A
of the players in some subset A ⊂ P, and outputs a possible value s˜j for the j-th secret. We write
s˜j ← Ω.Rec (pms, outpub, j, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A).
For correctness, we require that, for any index j ∈ {1, . . . , `} and any subset A ∈ Γj , it holds
Ω.Rec (pms, outpub, j, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A) = sj ,
if {(i, shi)}Pi∈A ⊂ {(i, shi)}Pi∈P and (outpub, {(i, shi)}Pi∈P) ← Ω.Dist (pms, s) is a distribution of the secret
s = (s1, . . . , sj , . . . , s`), and the setup protocol has produced pms← Ω.Stp
(
1λ,P, {(j, Γj)}1≤j≤`
)
.
The computational security of a multi-secret sharing scheme is defined by the following game G between a
challenger and an adversary AMSS. Although other (stronger) security games and notions could be considered,
we have chosen the following one, which is the direct analogue of the standard notion of semantic security
for encryption schemes.
1. The adversary AMSS publishes the set of players P and the ` access structures Γ1, . . . , Γ` ⊂ 2P .
2. The challenger runs pms← Ω.Stp (1λ,P, {(j, Γj)}1≤j≤`) and sends pms to AMSS.
3. The adversary AMSS broadcasts a subset B˜ ⊂ P of corrupted players.
4. AMSS broadcasts two different global secrets s(0) 6= s(1) with the restriction:
s
(0)
j = s
(1)
j , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `} s.t. B˜ ∈ Γj .
5. [Challenge] The challenger chooses at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs
(outpub, {(i, shi)}Pi∈P)← Ω.Dist
(
pms, s(b)
)
and sends
(
outpub, {(i, shi)}Pi∈B˜
)
to AMSS.
6. Finally, AMSS outputs a bit b′.
The advantage of AMSS in breaking the multi-secret sharing scheme Ω is defined as
AdvAMSS(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
The scheme Ω is said to enjoy computational security if AdvAMSS(λ) is a negligible function in λ, for any
polynomial-time adversary AMSS. We recall that a function f(k) is negligible in k if there exist a polynomial
p(·) and a value k0 ∈ N such that f(k) ≤ 1/p(k) for any k ≥ k0).
3 A Computationally Secure Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme
We introduce in this section a computationally secure multi-secret sharing scheme with provable security in the
random oracle model. The new scheme is very similar to some previous schemes [17, 23], which however did not
have a formal security proof. Although we describe and analyze the scheme in the setting of different threshold
access structures, it can be easily extended to work with more general access structures (see Appendix B).
After the description and analysis of this scheme, we will use it as a building block in the design of new
multi-policy signature and decryption schemes, in Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 The New Scheme
Setup: Ω.Stp(1λ,P, t1, . . . , t`).
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of n users and let 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n be the ` different thresholds
that define the access structures {Γj}1≤j≤`. A prime number p > n is chosen, such that p is at least λ bits
long. A hash function H : N × Z?p → Zp is also chosen. Each player Pi is assigned the value i. The public
parameters are pms = (p,H,P, t1, . . . , t`).
Distribution of the Shares: Ω.Dist(pms, s).
The secret to be distributed is s = (s1, . . . , s`) ∈ (Zp)`. For simplicity, we assume the distribution is done by
an external dealer; see Appendix A for a discussion on how the own members of P could run this protocol.
1. Choose random values shi ∈ Z?p, pairwise different for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, as the secret shares.
2. Choose random polynomials fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1, for j = 1, . . . , `, such that fj(0) = sj .
3. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , `, compute the values hij = H(j, shi) and rij = fj(i)− hij mod p.
4. The secret share shi is sent to player Pi via a secure channel, whereas the public output of the protocol
is outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P,j∈{1,...,`}.
Reconstruction of the Secrets: Ω.Rec(pms, outpub, j, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A).
When the players of an authorized subset A ∈ Γj (i.e. |A| ≥ tj) want to recover the secret sj , they must
cooperate performing the following steps.
1. Each player Pi ∈ A computes his pseudo secret share as hij = H(j, shi).
2. Take the values {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈A from outpub and compute fj(i) = rij + hij mod p, for every Pi ∈ A.
3. Use the values {(i, fj(i))}Pi∈A to interpolate the polynomial fj(x) and recover the j-secret sj = fj(0).
Note that the correctness of the proposed scheme holds directly via interpolation.
3.2 Security Analysis
In this section we prove the computational security of the proposed scheme, assuming that the hash function
H behaves as a random oracle [2].
Theorem 2. For any adversary AMSS against the described threshold MSS scheme that makes at most qH
queries to the random oracle for H, we have AdvAMSS(λ) ≤ qH(qH+n)2λ+1 + o
((
qH(qH+n)
2λ+1
)2)
.
Proof. Let AMSS be an adversary against the computational security of the multi-secret sharing scheme. We
act as the challeger of the security game described in Section 2.4. AMSS starts the game by choosing the
set of users P = {Pi}1≤i≤n and the threshold access structures {Γj}1≤j≤` with Γj = T (tj , n). We then run
pms ← Ω.Stp(1λ,P, t1, . . . , t`) and send pms = (p,H,P, t1, . . . , t`) to AMSS, who chooses a subset B˜ ⊂ P of
corrupted players with |B˜| = t?. Let J? = {j ∈ {1, . . . , `} s.t. tj ≤ t?}.
We choose random pairwise different elements shi ∈ Zp, for Pi ∈ P. If AMSS makes a hash query (j, x) to
the random oracle such that j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J? and x ∈ {shi}Pi /∈B˜, then we abort the game. Otherwise,
the query is answered by choosing a random element h ∈ Zp, storing the relation H(j, x) = h in a hash table,
and sending back the output h to AMSS. If a hash query (j, x) by AMSS is already in the hash table, the
stored value h is sent back to AMSS.
Challenge. At some point, AMSS outputs two different multi-secrets s(0) 6= s(1), such that s(0)j = s(1)j for all
j ∈ J?. We choose random polynomials fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1 and such that fj(0) = s(0)j , for
all j ∈ J?. For those values of j ∈ J?, we compute (via the hash-table procedure) the values hij = H(j, shi)
and rij = fj(i)− hij mod p, for all Pi ∈ P.
For the rest of values j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J?, we choose random pairs of polynomials f (0)j (x), f (1)j (x) ∈ Zp[x]
of degree at most tj − 1, such that f (0)j (0) = s(0)j , f (1)j (0) = s(1)j , and f (0)j (i) = f (1)j (i) for all corrupted players
Pi ∈ B˜. For indices i such that Pi ∈ B˜, we compute (via the hash-table procedure) the values hij = H(j, shi)
and rij = f
(0)
j (i)− hij mod p. For indices i such that Pi /∈ B˜, we choose at random rij ∈ Zp.
We give to AMSS the shares {(i, shi)}Pi∈B˜ of the corrupted players, as well as the public output of the
protocol outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P,j∈{1,...,`}.
For indices j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J? and indices i such that Pi /∈ B˜, let us define h(0)ij = rij − f (0)j (i) mod p
and h
(1)
ij = rij − f (1)j (i) mod p. We can choose at random a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and include in the hash-table the
values H(j, shi) = h
(β)
ij , for all i, j such that j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J? and Pi /∈ B˜. In this way, we are perfectly
simulating an execution of the distribution of shares for the secret s(β) = (s
(β)
1 , . . . , s
(β)
` ). The key point here
is that, as long as AMSS does not make any hash query H(j, shi) for indices i, j such that j ∈ {1, . . . , `},
j /∈ J? and Pi /∈ B˜, the information that AMSS gets is the same as if the shared secret was s(1−β).
Final analysis. Therefore, to compute the probability that AMSS guesses the correct shared secret, we dis-
tinguish between two cases, depending on whether AMSS makes a hash query H(j, shi) for indices i, j such
that j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J? and Pi /∈ B˜. If this is the case, which happens with probability δ, then we as-
sume the best case for AMSS: he always guesses the correct secret in that case. On the other hand, if AMSS
does not make such a hash query, which happens with probability 1 − δ, then the probability that AMSS
guesses correctly is exactly 1/2. Summing up, the probability that AMSS guesses the correct secret is at most
δ + 1/2(1− δ). Therefore, the advantage of AMSS is
AdvAMSS(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[AMSS guesses]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12δ(λ).
The probability δ(λ) that some of qH randomly chosen elements falls in a perfectly hidden subset {shi}Pi /∈B˜
of n− t? random elements of Zp can be bounded as
δ(λ) < 1−
(
p− (n+ qH − t? − 1)
p
)qH
=
qH(qH + n)
p
+ o
((
qH(qH + n)
p
)2)
.
Using that p > 2λ, we obtain the desired result AdvAMSS(λ) ≤ qH(qH+n)2λ+1 + o
((
qH(qH+n)
2λ+1
)2)
. uunionsq
The dominant term in the expression stated in the previous theorem is q2H , because the number n of players
will usually be small compared to qH . In cryptography, the number of hash queries is usually estimated as
qH ≤ 260. Therefore, the multi-secret sharing scheme described in this section satisfies a 80-bit security level
(that is, AdvAMSS(λ) < 2
−80) when λ ≥ 200 or, equivalently, when p ≥ 2200.
3.3 Efficiency and Comparison with other MSSS
In this section we analyze the efficiency of our new multi-secret sharing scheme, and we compare it with
other schemes (with computational security, as well) in the literature that lead to secret shares with constant
length. We stress that our scheme is the only one with a formal and complete security analysis. For simplicity,
we focus on the case of threshold access structures for this efficiency analysis.
In our scheme, the cost of sharing a global secret in (Zp)` among n players, according to threshold access
structures with thresholds t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ t`, is (roughly) equivalent to
∑`
j=1
tjn operations in Zp. The public
output contains ` · n elements in Zp, and the secret share shi of each player contains a single element in Zp.
The cost of recovering a particular secret sj depends linearly on the needed threshold tj .
The efficiency properties of the two schemes [17, 23] are essentially the same. Indeed, these two schemes
are very similar to our new scheme; roughly speaking, the scheme in [17] uses two-variable one-way functions
and the scheme in [23] uses iterated one-way hash functions, instead of our hash function H. Again, we insist
that the security analysis of the schemes in [17, 23] is not complete or formal.
We include another MSSS in the comparison that we summarize in Table 1, the one proposed by Cachin
in [9], which produces constant-length secret shares but, again, lacks a formal security analysis. The length
of outpub in Cachin’s scheme, as well as the cost of the distribution phase, depend linearly on the number
of minimal authorized subsets1 in each access structure; when the access structure is a threshold one, with
threshold t, this number is
(
n
t
)
, very big. Cachin’s MSS could be a good alternative for situations where all
the access structures have few minimal authorized subsets.
Table 1 below summarizes the efficiency aspects of these MSSS, when applied to share ` secrets s1, . . . , s`,
each one in Zp, among n players, according to ` threshold access structures, for thresholds t1 ≤ . . . ≤ t`.
cost of Ω.Dist cost of Ω.Rec(sj) length of outpub length of shi
Cachin’s MSSS [9]
∑`
j=1
(
n
tj
) O(tj) (∑`
j=1
(
n
tj
)) |p| |p|
Schemes in [17, 23]
∑`
j=1
tjn O(tj) n · ` · |p| |p|
Our new scheme
∑`
j=1
tjn O(tj) n · ` · |p| |p|
Table 1. Comparison between some threshold MSSS with computational security.
4 Application to Multi-Policy Distributed Signatures
In this section, we deal with distributed signatures. Threshold (or distributed) signatures have received also
a lot of attention from the cryptographic community [14, 30, 5]; they have applications in scenerios where the
cooperation of more than one single entity is necessary to authenticate a message. In our multi-policy setting,
we will have a set of users P = {P1, . . . , Pn} as the possible signers of messages. Depending on the content
and the importancy of the message, more or less members of P can be required to participate in the signing
1 Given an access structure Γ ⊂ 2P , a subset A ∈ Γ is minimal authorized if A− {Pi} /∈ Γ , for all Pi ∈ A.
process. In other words, the subset of real signers A ⊂ P will choose ad-hoc a signing policy Γj among a set
of pre-defined different signing policies Γ1, . . . , Γ`, such that A ∈ Γj , and will cooperate to sign the message
on behalf of that policy Γj . Each user Pi ∈ P will have a share shi of secret information, and will use it to
perform his part of the signing process. The final verification step will take as inputs the index j, the message,
the signature, and the global public key of the set P, in order to check the validity of the signature. Note
that the knowledge of identities of the real signers (in subset A) is not necessary to verify a signature, which
provides some kind of anonymity (if desired) to the process.
After defining the syntactic definition and the security model for this primitive of multi-policy distributed
signatures, we present a scheme for the case of threshold signing policies (that uses as a building block the
multi-secret sharing scheme in Section 3) and we prove its security. The scheme can be extended to work
with more general access structures, as we discuss in Appendix B.
4.1 Syntactic Definition
A multi-policy distributed signature scheme Θ = (Θ.St, Θ.KG, Θ.Sign, Θ.Ver) consists of four probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms:
– The randomized setup algorithm Θ.St takes a security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs some public param-
eters params that will be common to all the users in the system: the mathematical groups, generators,
hash functions, etc. We write params← Θ.St(1λ) to denote an execution of this algorithm.
– The key generation algorithm Θ.KG for a collective P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of n users and ` different signature
policies Γj ⊂ 2B for j = 1, . . . , ` has as public output a public key PK that will be used in both the
signing and verification steps. We implicitly assume that PK contains the description of P, Γ1, . . . , Γ`.
Each user Pi ∈ P receives a secret share shi. This key generation process for the collective P can be run
either by a trusted third party, or by the users in P themselves. We will write ({(i, shi)}1≤i≤n, PK) ←
Θ.KG(params,P, Γ1, . . . , Γ`) to refer to this key generation protocol.
– The joint signature algorithm Θ.Sign is a distributed protocol run by some subset of users A ⊂ P. The
common inputs are params, PK, a message m, the secret shares shi of the users Pi ∈ A, and the index
j of the desired signature policy Γj , where j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. The outputs are a signature σ and the index j
of the chosen signature policy. We write (σ, j)← Θ.Sign(params, PK,m,A, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A, j) to refer to an
execution of this protocol.
– The verification algorithm Θ.Ver takes as input params, a message m, a signature (σ, j), and the public
key PK of the intended receiver group P. The output will be 1 if (σ, j) is a valid signature of m and 0
otherwise. We denote an execution of this algorithm as {1, 0} ← Θ.Ver(params,m, σ, j, PK).
For correctness, Θ.Ver(params,m,Θ.Sign(params, PK,m,A, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A, j), PK) = 1 is required, when-
ever A ∈ Γj and the values params, {(i, shi)}1≤i≤n, PK have been obtained by properly executing the protocols
Θ.St and Θ.KG.
4.2 Security Model
A multi-policy distributed signature scheme must be robust. The robustness property holds when the protocols
Θ.KG and Θ.Sign always complete successfully, even under the action of a polynomial-time adversary that is
allowed to corrupt an unauthorized set of users.
As any other primitive related to signatures, a multi-policy distributed signature scheme Θ must also be
unforgeable. That is, any polynomial-time adversary that is allowed to corrupt a subset of users B˜ ⊂ P such
that B˜ /∈ Γj must have negligible probability of success in producing a new valid signature for some message
with respect to signing policy Γj , even if this adversary has access to a signing oracle for messages and signing
policies of his choice. This property is known as unforgeability against chosen message attacks (UNF security,
for short) and is defined, for a security parameter λ ∈ N, by considering the following game that an attacker
AUNF plays against a challenger:
1. The challenger runs params← Θ.St(1λ) and gives params to AUNF.
2. AUNF chooses a target set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of users, ` different signature policies Γj ⊂ 2P , for j = 1, . . . , `,
and a subset B˜ ⊂ P of users, to be corrupted. The challenger runs ({(i, shi)}1≤i≤n, PK)← Θ.KG(params,
P, Γ1, . . . , Γ`) and gives to AUNF the values PK and {(i, shi)}Pi∈B˜.
We consider only static adversaries who choose the subset B˜ of corrupted users at the beginning of the
attack.
3. [Queries] AUNF can make adaptive queries to a distributed signing oracle for the target set P: AUNF
sends a tuple (m, j) for the signature policy Γj . The challenger runs the distributed signature algorithm
(σ, j)← Θ.Sign(params,m,A, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A, j) for an authorized subset A ∈ Γj . The attacker AUNF must
be given all the information that corrupted players (in B˜) would obtain during the execution of this
protocol Θ.Sign, including the final signature and all the broadcast information.
4. At some point, AUNF outputs a forgery (j?,m?, σ?). We say that AUNF is successful if: (1) B˜ /∈ Γj , (2)
Θ.Ver(params,m?, σ?, j?, PK) = 1, and (3) (j?,m?, σ?) has not been obtained by AUNF in a signature
query (step 3).
The advantage of such a (static) adversary AUNF in breaking the UNF security of the multi-policy dis-
tributed signature scheme is defined as the probability that AUNF is successful in the game above.
A multi-policy distributed signature scheme Θ is UNF secure if the advantage of any such polynomial-time
(static) adversary AUNF is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
4.3 A New Multi-Policy Signature Scheme
We propose here a new multi-policy distributed signature scheme, that we describe (for simplicity) for the
case where all the signing policies are threshold ones: Γj = T (tj , n) for j = 1, . . . , `, where 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . <
t` ≤ n. See Appendix B for an extension of this scheme to the case of more general access structures. The
scheme is inspired by the (single) threshold signature scheme proposed by Boldyreva in [5] (which is itself
inspired by the individual signature scheme of Boneh-Lynn-Shacham [7]). A key ingredient in the design of
the new scheme will be the multi-secret sharing scheme proposed and analyzed in Section 3. We also need to
introduce the notion of Gap Diffie-Hellman groups, which is related to the Diffie-Hellman problems.
Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p, such that p is λ
bits long. The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH, for short) problem can be defined as the problem of
computing the value gab on input the values (g, ga, gb), for random elements a, b ∈ Z∗p. The Computational
Diffie-Hellman Assumption states that the CDH problem is hard to solve. A bit more formally, for any
polynomial-time algorithm ACDH that receives as input G, g, ga, gb, for random elements a, b ∈ Z∗p, we can
define as AdvACDH(λ) the probability that ACDH outputs the value gab. The Computational Diffie-Hellman
Assumption states that AdvACDH(λ) is negligible in λ.
The (easier) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem tries to decide whether the four group elements
(g, ga, gb, h) are all random or they are a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, that is h = gab. Groups where the CDH
problem is hard to solve but the DDH problem is easy are called Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups. See
[21, 6, 26] for more details on GDH groups; up to now, the only known GDH groups are related to bilinear
pairings on elliptic curves.
The protocols of the new multi-policy signature scheme Θ work as follows.
Setup: Θ.St(1λ).
Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, a GDH group G = 〈g〉 of prime order p, such that p is λ bits long, is
chosen. Two hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G are chosen. The output of this protocol
is params = (p,G, g,H0, H1).
Key Generation: Θ.KG(params,P, t1, . . . , t`, n).
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n users and let Γj = T (tj , n) for j = 1, . . . , ` be the threshold signing policies
defined on P, where 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n.
For j = 1, . . . , `, the value PKj = g
sj is computed, for a random value sj ∈ Z∗p that will remain
unknown to the members of P. These ` secret values will correspond to a secret vector s = (s1, . . . , s`) of the
multi-secret sharing scheme described in Section 3, that will be shared by running the distribution protocol
Ω.Dist(P, t1, . . . , t`, s), with hash function H0:
1. Choose random values shi ∈ Z?p, pairwise different for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, as the secret shares.
2. Choose random polynomials fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1, for j = 1, . . . , `, such that fj(0) = sj .
3. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , `, compute the values hij = H0(j, shi) and rij = fj(i) − hij mod p.
Compute the public verification values Dij = g
hij+rij .
4. The secret share shi is sent to player Pi via a secure channel, whereas the public output of the protocol
is outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P,j∈{1,...,`}.
The global public key is PK = (PK1, . . . , PK`, outpub, {(i, j,Dij)}Pi∈P,1≤j≤`), whereas the secret share
for each player Pi is shi.
Joint Signature: Θ.Sign(params, PK,m,A, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A, j).
Let A ⊂ P be a subset of users in P that want to cooperate to sign a message m with respect to a signing
policy Γj = T (tj , n) for which they form an authorized subset, A ∈ Γj . Members of A proceed as follows:
1. Each Pi ∈ A computes hij = H0(j, shi), recovers rij from outpub and broadcasts his signature share
σij = H1(m, j)
hij+rij ∈ G.
2. The rest of members of A verify if (g,Dij , H1(m, j), σij) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
3. If there are not tj valid signature shares (i, σij), then stop and output ⊥. Otherwise, from tj valid
signature shares {(i, σij)}Pi∈A, one can consider the Lagrange interpolation coefficients λAij ∈ Zp such that
sj = fj(0) =
∑
Pi∈A
λAij · fj(i).
4. Return the resulting signature and index (σ, j), where σ =
∏
Pi∈A
σ
λAij
ij .
Verification: Θ.Ver(params,m, σ, j, PK)
In the verification step it is enough to check if (g, PKj , H1(m, j), σ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Return 1
if this is the case, or 0 otherwise.
4.4 Security Analysis
The multi-policy threshold signature scheme described in the previous section, with a trusted dealer in charge
of the key generation phase, is trivially robust: during the joint signature generation phase, cheating players
are detected in step 2 and rejected from the protocol. Assuming the remaining players are enough (i.e. they
are at least tj), the signing protocol finishes correctly. One way to ensure this is by requiring that an adversary
can corrupt at most n− t` players.
Regarding unforgeability, we now prove that the proposed scheme is UNF secure provided the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard in the GDH group G. The proof is in the random oracle model
for hash functions H0, H1.
Theorem 3. In the random oracle model, the scheme Θ is UNF secure, assuming the Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard to solve in the GDH group G.
Proof. The proof is by reduction, assuming that hash functions H0, H1 are modeled as random oracles. An
adversary AUNF that has non-negligible success in forging a new valid signature is used to construct an
algorithm ACDH that solves the CDH problem in G.
ACDH receives as input (g, ga, gb), where G = 〈g〉 is a GDH group of prime order p. The goal of ACDH
is to compute gab. The algorithm ACDH initializes the attacker AUNF by giving params = (p,G, g,H0, H1)
to him. Since the hash functions H0, H1 are supposed to behave as random oracles, ACDH will create and
maintain tables TAB0 and TAB1 to answer the hash queries from AUNF. These answers are produced by ACDH
by first checking if there already exists an entry in the corresponding table for the input of the hash query;
if so, ACDH responds with the existing output; otherwise, ACDH chooses a new random output, adds the new
relation input-output to the corresponding table, and responds to AUNF with this output value. Hash queries
(m, j) to H1 are answered in the following way. Let q1 be the maximum number of such H1 queries. ACDH
chooses at random an index k? ∈ {1, . . . , q1} for a special query (m˜, j˜). For this special query, ACDH chooses
a random value β˜ ∈ Zp and defines the relation H1(m˜, j˜) = (ga)β˜. For the rest of H1 queries (m, j), ACDH
chooses a random value β ∈ Zp and defines the relation H1(m, j) = gβ. These relations are stored in TAB1.
Key distribution. AUNF chooses the target collective P? = {P1, . . . , Pn}, the decryption policies Γj =
T (tj , n) ⊂ 2B for j = 1, . . . , ` where t1 < t2 < · · · < t`, and also the subset of corrupted members
B˜ ⊂ P?. For simplicity, we assume B˜ = {P1, . . . , Pt?}, where 1 ≤ t? ≤ n. Let us define the set of in-
dices J? = {j ∈ {1, . . . , `} s.t. tj ≤ t?}, so that the corrupted players can trivially sign messages for signing
policies Γj , if j ∈ J?.
For the corrupted members of P?, the algorithm ACDH chooses randomly and independently the shares
shi ∈ Zp producing the set {(i, shi)}Pi∈B˜.
For every index j ∈ J?, the algorithm ACDH chooses at random a secret sj ∈ Z∗p and a polynomial
fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1 such that fj(0) = sj . It computes (via the hash-table procedure) the
values hij = H0(j, shi), rij = fj(i) − hij mod p, for all Pi ∈ B˜. For the non-corrupted players, Pi /∈ B˜, the
algorithm ACDH chooses random and independent values rij ∈ Zp, then computes the values fj(i) by using
the chosen polynomial. Finally, ACDH computes the values PKj = gsj and Dij = gfj(i), for all Pi ∈ P?.
For the rest of indices j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, j /∈ J?, the algorithm ACDH chooses at random αj ∈ Zp and defines
PKj = (g
b)αj (which implicitly defines sj = b · αj). For each j /∈ J?, ACDH chooses at random the values rij ,
for all Pi ∈ P. In particular, this means that, for the corrupted members Pi ∈ B˜, we have that the values
rij +H0(j, shi) mod p are already determined. Let fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] be an implicit polynomial of degree at most
tj − 1 such that fj(0) = b · αj mod p and fj(i) = rij + H0(j, shi) mod p, for every corrupted player Pi ∈ B˜.
Since |B˜| = t? < tj , the algorithm ACDH can compute the values Dij = grij+H0(j,shi), for Pi ∈ B˜, and then
combine these values with PKj = (g
b)αj in order to obtain, by interpolation in the exponent, the rest of
values Dij = g
fj(i), for non-corrupted players Pi /∈ B˜.
Finally ACDH sends to the adversary AUNF the secret keys {(i, shi)}Pi∈B˜ of the corrupted players, along
with the public information PK = (PK1, . . . , PK`, outpub, {Dij}Pi∈P?,1≤j≤`), where outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P?,j∈{1,...,`}.
Simulating H0. As it happened in the proof of Theorem 2, the simulation of the hash function H0 is consistent
as long as the H0 hash queries from AUNF do not cause a collision with the implicitly determined values
{shi}Pi /∈B˜. If the number of hash queries for H0 is q0, such a collision happens with probability at most
q20
2p + o
((
q20
2p
)2)
, which is a negligible function of the security parameter λ ≤ log p.
Signing queries. Let (m, j) be a signing query asked by AUNF. If (m, j) = (m˜, j˜), then ACDH aborts and
outputs ⊥. Otherwise, ACDH knows a value β such that H1(m, j) = gβ. Then, ACDH can easily compute
correct signature shares σij = H1(m, j)
hij+rij =
(
ghij+rij
)β
= Dβij , for every player Pi ∈ P?.
Forgery. At some point, and with non-negligible probability, AUNF outputs a valid signature (σ?, j?) for some
index j /∈ J? and some message m?, different from the valid signatures obtained through signing queries.
Since the signature is valid and H1 behaves as a random function, AUNF must have queried the pair (m
?, j?)
to the hash oracle for H1. With probability at least 1/q1, we have (m
?, j?) = (m˜, j˜), and in this case we
have H1(m
?, j?) = (ga)β˜, for some value β known by ACDH, whereas the associated part of the public
key is PKj = (g
b)αj , for some value αj also known by ACDH. Since σ? is a valid signature, we have that
(
g, (gb)αj , (ga)β˜, σ?
)
is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, which means that σ? = gabαj β˜. In this case, ACDH can
easily obtain the desired solution gab of the given instance of the CDH problem. uunionsq
For simplicity, we have described a security reduction with a loss factor of q1. It is possible to improve this
reduction by using the techniques of Coron [10], and then the loss factor becomes linear in qS , the number
of signing queries, which is usually considered to be smaller than the number q1 of hash queries.
5 Application to Multi-Policy Distributed Decryption
In this section, we consider the secret task of decryption, instead of signature. We will have a set of users
P = {P1, . . . , Pn} as the receivers of confidential messages. There will be ` different access structures Γj ⊂ 2P
defined on P, for j = 1, . . . , `. When encrypting, the sender will choose the desired decryption access structure
Γj . A ciphertext encrypted for the access structure (or decryption policy) Γj will be correctly decrypted only
if the users in some subset A ∈ Γj cooperate to run the protocol Decrypt. Each user Pi ∈ P will have a share
shi of secret information, and will use it to perform his part of the decryption process.
A multi-policy distributed decryption scheme Σ = (Σ.St, Σ.KG, Σ.Enc, Σ.Decrypt) consists of four prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms: setup, key generation, encryption (public), and decryption (secret and
distributed). The encryption algorithm takes as input the index j for the intended decryption policy, and this
index j must be included in the output ciphertext. The joint decryption protocol takes as input a ciphertext
and secret shares of an authorized subset (according to Γj); the result is a plaintext or a special reject symbol
⊥.
A correct encryption scheme must satisfy the proper confidentiality property. In the distributed setting
that we are considering, confidentiality must hold even if an attacker corrupts many members of the collective
of receivers, provided the corrupted members are not authorized to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. That
is, a ciphertext on the message m addressed to P for access structure Γj leaks no information on m to an
attacker who has corrupted a subset of users B˜ ⊂ P such that B˜ /∈ Γj . This attacker can also make decryption
queries for pairs ciphertexts of his choice. If Σ is secure in front of this kind of (polynomial time) adversaries,
then we say it enjoys the property of indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security,
for short). This property can be formalized with a security game, but we omit here the details, because it is
basically a combination of the security game for the security of (single policy) distributed decryption (see for
instance [31]) and the game for multi-policy signatures that we have described in Section 4.2.
5.1 A New Multi-Policy Decryption Scheme
We propose here a new multi-policy distributed decryption scheme. For simplicity we describe the scheme
when all the decryption policies are threshold ones; that is, Γj = T (tj , n) for j = 1, . . . , `, where 1 ≤ t1 <
t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n; the scheme can be extended to work with more general access structures (see Appendix
B). The scheme is inspired by the (single) threshold decryption scheme proposed by Shoup and Gennaro in
[31]. A key ingredient in the design of the new scheme is, again, the multi-secret sharing scheme proposed
and analyzed in Section 3. The protocols of the multi-policy decryption scheme Σ work as follows.
Setup: Σ.St(1λ).
Given a security parameter λ ∈ N, a group G = 〈g〉 of prime order p, such that p is λ bits long, is chosen.
A positive integer l ∈ N, which must be polynomial in λ, is chosen for the maximum number of bits of
the messages to be encrypted. Five hash functions are chosen: H0 : {0, 1}∗ × Z∗p → Zp, H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}l, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. The output of this protocol is params =
(p,G, g, l,H0, H1, H2, H3, H4).
Key Generation: Σ.KG(params,P, t1, . . . , t`, n).
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n users and Γj = T (tj , n) for j = 1, . . . , ` the threshold decryption policies
defined on P, where 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n. For j = 1, . . . , `, the value PKj = gsj is computed, for a
random value sj ∈ Z∗p that will remain unknown to the members of P. These ` secret values will correspond
to a secret vector s = (s1, . . . , s`) of the multi-secret sharing scheme described in Section 3, that will be
shared by running the distribution protocol Ω.Dist(P, t1, . . . , t`, s), with hash function H0:
1. Choose random values shi ∈ Z?p, pairwise different for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, as the secret shares.
2. Choose random polynomials fj(x) ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1, for j = 1, . . . , `, such that fj(0) = sj .
3. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , `, compute the values hij = H0(j, shi) and rij = fj(i)− hij mod p.
4. The secret share shi is sent to player Pi via a secure channel, whereas the public output of the protocol
is outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P,j∈{1,...,`}.
The secret share for each player Pi is shi, whereas the global public key is PK = (PK1, . . . , PK`, outpub).
In case one wants to provide robustness to the threshold decryption process, the values Dij = g
hij+rij must
be included in PK, for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , `.
Encryption: Σ.Enc(params,m, PK, j).
1. Choose at random the values ru, rw ∈ Z∗p.
2. Compute c = H1(PK
ru
j , j)⊕m.
3. Use the element g to compute u = gru and w = grw .
4. Use the value g¯ = H2(c, u, w, j) to compute u¯ = g¯
ru and w¯ = g¯rw .
5. Compute e = H3(g¯, u¯, w¯, j) and σ = rw + ru · emod p.
6. Return (C, j) with the ciphertext C = (c, u, u¯, e, σ).
Joint Decryption: Σ.Decrypt(params, C, j, PK,A, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A)
Let A ⊂ P be a subset of users in P that want to cooperate to decrypt a ciphertext C = (c, u, u¯, e, σ)
according to the threshold decryption policy T (tj , n). We assume, thus, |A| ≥ tj . Players in A proceed as
follows.
1. Each Pi ∈ A checks if e = H3(g¯, u¯, w¯, j), where w = gσ/ue, g¯ = H2(c, u, w, j), w¯ = g¯σ/u¯e.
If this equality does not hold, Pi broadcasts (i,⊥).
2. Otherwise, Pi ∈ A chooses vij ∈ Zp at random, recovers rij from outpub, computes hij = H0(j, shi) and
broadcasts the tuple (i, uij , eij , σij), where
uij = u
hij+rij , ûij = u
vij , ĥij = g
vij , eij = H4(uij , ûij , ĥij)
and σij = vij + (hij + rij) · eij mod p
[If robustness is required, the correctness of this tuple can be publicly verified by checking if eij =
H4(uij , ûij , ĥij), where ûij = u
σij/u
eij
ij , ĥij = g
σij/D
eij
ij . Note that this check ensures that (u,Dij , uij) is a
valid Diffie-Hellman triple.]
3. If there are no tj valid shares, stop and output ⊥. Otherwise, from tj valid tuples {(i, uij , eij , σij)}Pi∈A,
different from (i,⊥), one can consider the Lagrange interpolation coefficients λAij ∈ Zp such that sj =
fj(0) =
∑
Pi∈A
λAij · fj(i).
4. Return the message m = c⊕H1(
∏
Pi∈A
u
λAij
ij , j).
5.2 Security Analysis
A first attempt to prove the security of the new multi-policy decryption scheme would be to reduce its
security to the security of the inherent multi-secret sharing scheme, which is proved in Section 3.2. However,
such a reduction does not work, because in the new decryption scheme, the values PKj = g
sj are public,
for j = 1, . . . , `. In this scenario it is trivial to distinguish between two potentially shared secrets s
(0)
j 6= s(1)j ,
chosen by the adversary. Therefore, in order to prove the security of the multi-policy decryption scheme,
we have to construct a whole proof, simulating all the values that an adversary AIND-CCA would see in
the execution of the different protocols of Σ. We would use the hypothetical existence of such a successful
adversary AIND-CCA to solve a computationally hard problem, the CDH problem.
This proof is basically a combination of the techniques in the security proof of the threshold decryption
scheme in [31] and the techniques that we have already used in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, and so it is
omitted. The proof is in the random oracle model for the five hash functions H0, H1, H2, H3, H4. The result
that ensures the security of the new multi-policy distributed decryption scheme is the following theorem.
Theorem 4. In the random oracle model, the scheme Σ is IND-CCA secure, assuming the Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve in G.
6 Relations with Attribute-Based Cryptography
In an attribute-based cryptosystem, each user has a subset of attributes A ⊂ P from a universe P =
{at1, . . . , atn} of attributes, and receives from a trusted master entity a secret key according to those attributes.
Later, the specific access policy Γ ⊂ 2P defining the subsets of attributes that must be held by someone so
that he is able to perform the secret task (either decrypting or signing) is chosen “on the fly”, among all
the possible (monotone increasing) access policies in P. Attribute-based cryptosystems have received a lot
of attention from the cryptographic community in the last years, and different schemes have been proposed
both for encryption (see for instance [16, 22]) and for signatures (for instance, in [24, 18]).
It is easy to see that attribute-based cryptosystems are (in some way) a more general primitive than the
primitives of multi-policy distributed cryptosystems that we have introduced in this work. Let us consider,
for instance, the case of encryption/decryption (the case of signatures work in an analogous way). Let us take
an attribute-based encryption scheme, and let us associate each attribute ati ∈ P with one player Pi ∈ P.
Each player receives from the master entity the secret key (or secret share) shi corresponding to the fact of
holding only attribute ati (all these secret keys sh1, . . . , shn are computed by the master entity in a single
execution of the key generation protocol, with a common randomness). Later, the sender of a message m
addressed to P chooses the desired decryption policy Γ ⊂ 2P and encrypts m by using the attribute-based
encryption protocol. Only if an authorized subset of players A ⊂ P, A ∈ Γ put together their secret shares,
they will be able to run the attribute-based decryption protocol and recover the message m.
Therefore, it seems that the primitives of multi-policy distributed decryption and signature can be already
implemented by using existing attribute-based cryptosystems, and actually the resulting schemes are more
general, because the allowed decryption / signing policies must not be, in principle, inside a pre-defined
list {Γ1, . . . , Γ`}, as it happens in our multi-policy distributed cryptosystems; they can be whatever access
policy defined on the set P. However, we will explain below a list of drawbacks suffered by this attribute-
based approach, as opposed to the direct approach that we have followed in this work to design multi-policy
distributed cryptosystems.
Restricted access policies. Even if, in theory, an attribute-based cryptosystem could allow encryptions or
signatures for any access policy Γ ⊂ 2P , in specific proposals this is not always the case. For instance, the
most efficient attribute-based cryptosystems proposed up to date (in terms of the length of ciphertexts or
signatures, the computational cost of the protocols, etc.) admit only threshold policies [1, 18]. The resulting
functionality can be achieved by our multi-threshold decryption and signature schemes, by taking ` = n and
tj = j, for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Necessity of a trusted master entity. In any attribute-based cryptosystem, a master entity must generate and
distribute the secret keys between users. This means that this entity has to be trusted, because otherwise it
could impersonate any user in the system. Although we have described our multi-threshold schemes with a
trusted dealer who generates and distributes the secret shares, this is not an intrinsic property of this kind of
schemes, and actually we show in Appendix A how the own players in P can generate the public parameters
and the secret shares by themselves, without the participation of any external (and trusted) dealer.
Length of ciphertexts, public parameters, signatures and secret shares. In most of the attribute-based cryp-
tosystems proposed so far, the length of the ciphertexts or signatures is at least linear in the number of
attributes involved in the access policy (which, for simplicity, we assume to be n). In our multi-threhold
cryptosystems, the length of ciphertexts and signatures is constant. The only attribute-based cryptosystems
with constant-length ciphertexts or signatures [1, 18], on the other hand, have secret keys whose length is at
least linear in n. In our multi-threshold schemes, each secret key (or share) contains a single element in Zp.
The length of the public parameters in our schemes, which is linear in n · `, is comparable to the length of the
public parameters in all existing attribute-based cryptosystems, which is at least linear in n, and sometimes
linear in n2.
Computational assumptions. Up to now, all the existing (and moderately efficient) attribute-based cryptosys-
tems with a formal proof of security make use of bilinear pairings, and base their security on (sometimes,
quite artificial) computational assumptions related to bilinear groups. For multi-policy distributed cryptosys-
tems, we have seen that they can be constructed by combining, essentially, a multi-secret sharing scheme
with a standard distributed cryptosystem. The particular instantiation of a multi-policy distributed decryp-
tion scheme that we have described and analyzed in Section 5, for instance, is provably secure under the
well-established assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
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A Joint Generation of the Secret Shares
For simplicity, in both our MSSS and our multi-policy distributed decryption/signature schemes, we have
assumed the existence of a trusted entity, a dealer, who generates some secret keys, distributes the shares
between all the participants using a secure channel and outputs the public information.
Let us show how the own members of P = {P1, . . . , Pn} could do this task by themselves, for the proposed
MSSS, without any interaction with a trusted entity. The setup protocolΩ.Stp(1λ,P, Γ1, . . . , Γ`) works exactly
in the same way: we will have 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < . . . < t` ≤ n for the ` different thresholds that define the access
structures {Γj}1≤j≤`, and will choose a large prime p > n and a hash function H : N×Z?p → Zp. For simplicity,
we assume that the adversary is honest-but-curious, and so data is not corrupted.
Generation of the Secret and Distribution of the Shares: Ω.Dist(pms).
Now the global secret s ∈ (Zp)` that will be distributed is not an input of the protocol, because it will be
generated by players in P “on the fly”, according to the following steps.
1. Every Pi ∈ P chooses a random value shi ∈ Z?p as his secret share.
2. Every Pi ∈ P chooses random values sij , a(1)ij , a(2)ij , . . . , a(tj−1)ij in Zp, for j = 1, . . . , `, to use in the poly-
nomial fij(x) = sij + a
(1)
ij x+ a
(2)
ij x
2 + . . .+ a
(tj−1)
ij x
tj−1 ∈ Zp[x] of degree at most tj − 1. The secret sj is
implicitly defined as sj =
∑
Pi∈P sij =
∑
Pi∈P fij(0), and the global secret is s = (s1, . . . , s`) ∈ (Zp)`.
3. Every Pi ∈ P sends the ` values {fij(k)}1≤j≤` to the other participants Pk ∈ P. At this point, the
participant Pk ∈ P is able to compute his own secret value bkj =
∑
Pi∈P fij(k), which is a polynomial
(Shamir) share of the secret sj .
4. Every Pi ∈ P computes hij = H(j, shi) and broadcasts the values rij = bij −hij mod p, for j = 1, 2, . . . , `.
5. Finally, the public output of the protocol is outpub = {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈P,j∈{1,...,`}.
Reconstruction of the Secrets: Ω.Rec(pms, outpub, j, {(i, shi)}Pi∈A).
When the players of an authorized subset A ∈ Γj (i.e. |A| ≥ tj) want to recover the secret sj , they must
cooperate performing the following steps.
1. Each player Pi ∈ A computes hij = H(j, shi).
2. Take the values {(i, j, rij)}Pi∈A from outpub and compute bij = rij + hij mod p, for every Pi ∈ A.
3. Use the values {bij}Pi∈A to interpolate the polynomial Fj(x) =
∑
Pi∈P fij(x) in x = 0, recovering in this
way the j-th secret sj = Fj(0).
The idea to make the scheme secure against active adversaries (who can send incorrect values during
the protocol) is to consider verifiable secret sharing techniques ([13, 27]) as described for instance in [15].
Slight modifications of the scheme above are necessary to achieve this goal. For instance, every participant
Pi ∈ P must publish, in Step 2 of the protocol Ω.Dist, the commitments A(u)ij = ga
(u)
ij to the coefficients of
his polynomials, with j ∈ {1, . . . , `} and u ∈ {1, . . . , tj − 1}. Later, these commitments are used to detect
incorrect values that are sent in Step 3 of the protocol Ω.Dist or broadcast in Step 2 of the protocol Ω.Rec.
B More General Access Structures
We have described our new MSSS (Section 3) and our new multi-policy distributed decryption and signature
schemes (Sections 5.1 and 4.3) for the particular case where the access structures Γ1, . . . , Γ` are all threshold
ones. However, all these protocols can be easily extended to the case of more general access structures, as
long as they admit a linear and ideal secret sharing scheme (also known as vector space secret sharing scheme
[8]).
An access structure Γ is realizable by vector space secret sharing scheme, over a finite field K, if there
exist a positive integer h and a map ψ : P∪{D} −→ (K)h, such that A ∈ Γ if and only if ψ(D) ∈ 〈ψ(Pi)〉Pi∈A.
If a dealer wants to distribute a secret value s ∈ K according to such an access structure, he takes a random
vector ω ∈ (K)h, such that ω · ψ(D) = s. The share of a player Pi ∈ P is shi = ω · ψ(Ri) ∈ K. Let A be an
authorized subset, A ∈ Γ ; then, by definition, ψ(D) = ∑Pi∈A λAi ψ(Pi), for some values λAi ∈ K. In order to
recover the secret from their shares, players in A compute∑
Pi∈A
λAi shi =
∑
Pi∈A
λAi (ω · ψ(Pi)) = ω ·
∑
Pi∈A
λAi ψ(Pi) = ω · ψ(D) = s.
Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme, with threshold t, can be seen as a particular case of vector
space secret sharing, by defining ψ(D) = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ (Zq)t and ψ(Pi) = (1, i, i2, . . . , it−1) ∈ (K)t for every
player Pi ∈ P.
If we come back to our new MSSS, in Section 3, it can be easily modified to work in situations where each
access structure Γj admits a vector space secret sharing scheme. We just have to replace polynomials with
vectors, and polynomial evaluations with scalar products.
The same happens with our multi-policy distributed cryptosystems. If the access structures admit a vector
space secret sharing scheme, then the Key Generation process can be modified as explained above; later, the
encryption / decryption or signature / verification operations can be (slightly) modified to work with these
more general access structures and linear secret sharing schemes, because they involve only linear operations
(additions and multiplications with a constant value). Even the version of our protocols that works without
any trusted dealer (see Appendix A) can be extended using the ideas and techniques from [19].
